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An experimental investigation of the relationship between communicator dominance and 
persuasion is reported. In the study, persuasion was examined as a function of experimental 
treatments that differed only in the perceived dominance of stimulus embedded within a text. 
Perceived dominance of the stimulus is operationally defined as the degree to which the 
stimulus makes the recipient feel submissive (high) or powerful (low). The experimental 
stimuli and the quantitative measurements of dominance are derived from affect control 
theory and a research tool that has been developed from that theory, the International 
Affective Picture System. The hypotheses were generally supported by the results of the data 
analysis. Relationships were found between perceived dominance and a) increased opinion 
agreement and b) increased trustworthiness of communicators. Possible implications for 
communication studies, as well as on research on affect control theory are discussed, as are 
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The effects of perceived dominance in persuasion 
 
Human beings are not adept at accurate causal judgments, often deviating from what purely 
rational models might predict (Roese,1997). 
 
It has been suggested that the powerfulness that a person or object conveys has greatinfluence 
on interpersonal relationships and communication. According to Russel (1938) “the 
fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same way that Energy is the 
fundamental concept in physics” (p. 10). The importance that Russel gives this variable was 
not, however, manifested immediately in the practice of social psychology. This was noticed 
by Cartwright (1959) who commented: “Both early social psychology and modern society 
recognize the importance of power … [but if] we examine social psychology since the 
beginning of its scientific epoch, we search in vain for any concentrated attack on the 
problem” (p. 2). As we shall see, despite the importance linked to this variable, powerfulness, 
in communication research it is usually left out as a factor that influences persuasion.  
The present study is performed with several intentions. Its first aim is to establish a 
place for social power, measured through the effect of perceived dominance on opinion 
agreement, in communication research. Secondly the study attempts to integrate affect control 
theory to important models of communication. Finally, if evidence is found for a relationship 
between dominance, as defined through affect control theory, its consequences for important 
communication research models will be evaluated.  
 
Social power 
Social power has been defined as ”the degree of control that a person or a group has over 
other persons or groups” (Reber & Reber, p. 553) or simply the ”ability, right, control and 
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authority to do or act” (Hornby, 1984, p. 652). It can be manifested as the ability to compel 
another to act against his or her will and, at the same time, the ability to withstand such effects 
from others (Reber & Reber, p. 553). Similarly, German sociologist Max Weber defined 
power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability 
rests” (Weber, 1978, quoted in Barbalet, 1985). 
Power is thought by some theorists to be divisible into components. Coleman (2000), for 
example, defines power as ”the ability to make things happen or to bring about desired
outcomes” (p. 121) and distinguishes between several modes to explain this variable. These 
include power as a dynamic, where power is determined by the characteristics of the person, 
the situation, and the interaction of these two factors; environmental power or the degre to 
which an individual can influence his or her overall environment; relationship power, or the 
power to influence another person, and personal power, or the degree to which a person can 
satisfy his or her own desires (p. 122). Similarly, French and Raven (1959) identified six 
different bases of social power in interpersonal relations and communication. These wer  
coercive power; which resides with a person who has the ability to punish a target for non-
cooperation; reward power, which is in the hands of whoever can offer rewards to a target for 
compliance; legitimate power, one in which the targets confer on an agent because they 
believe that he or she has the right to expect cooperation; referent power, which has for its 
source desirable and attractive personal qualities of the agent that leads to recipients’ desire to 
associate wit him or her; and expert power, which stems from the extensive information or 
knowledge that recipients perceive the agent to have (Wrench & Booth-Butterfield, 2003)1.  
 
 
                                                
1 Incidentally French and Ravens taxonomies are closely congruent with Max Weber’s classifications of the 
concept Herrschaft, or authority (Giddens, 2006). 
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Power and persuasion 
There are various means to measure power and its effect of individuals and society at large. 
In the current study the focus will be on its effect on persuasion. This is not counter to 
intuition considering that persuasion is a major means to exercise social power. According to 
Reber and Reber (2001) social power can be upheld with coercion or violence, but 
“persuasion is a more common vehicle for exerting control” (p. 513). But as we shall see, for 
some of the most important models for persuasion studies Cartwrights comments still hold. 
Despite the importance linked to power, it is largely ignored as a factor tha influences 
persuasion. 
Traditionally, studies on the effects of social factors on the attitudes and behaviours of 
people in communication settings identify several interdependent components that should be 
studied independently. As an example, in his study of advertising effectiveness, McGuire 
(1978) distinguished between five components of persuasive communication that could be fit 
into a model of persuasive communication. These were source, channel, message, receiver
and destination. This classification has its origin in Lasswell’s (1948) famous contribution to 
communication studies in which he described that a “convenient way to describe an act of 
communication is to answer the following questions: Who says what to whom with what 
effect?” (p. 37). This way of describing communication was adopted by Carl I. Hovland and 
his colleagues in Yale University and the United States Army. Their appro ch is often 
referred to as the message learning approach, or the Yale model of communication research. 
The Yale model offered research methods and variables for these that have since been used 
extensively by subsequent researchers. In a series of extensive studies presented by Hovland, 
Janis, and Kelley (1953), four so-called mediating processes to message learning we e 
identified. According to their model the recipient must pay attention to the message, 
comprehend it, identify incentives for attitude change, and retain the information in the 
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message. In addition to the message arguments, three variables were expectd to affect the 
mediating processes. These were the source of the message, the medium through which the 
message was delivered, and the recipient of the message. Together, these proc ses and 
variables had the potential to produce change in the receivers’ beliefs, attitudes or behaviour. 
More recent persuasion models base much of their theoretical underpinnings on the tradition
upheld by Hovland’s model.  
Numerous models on persuasive communication exist (for extensive reviews see Cameron, 
2009, and Jowett & O’Donnel, 1999), but in the current study, the focus will be on the 
approaches exemplified by the elaboration likelihood model and the heuristics sysematic 
models. In addition to being among the most widely used and studies models of persuasion, 
(Cameron 2009), these models place high focus on the interplay between source- and 
recipient factors. The current study’s primary focus, the effects of perceiv d dominance on 
persuasion variables, is an example of such interplay. 
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacciopo, 1981), people follow 
persuasion attempts follow two paths, or routes. When a receiver is motivated and able to 
consider the information, he or she is likely to elaborate the message thoughtfully and 
scrutinize the quality of the arguments. Under these conditions the receiver is said to follow a 
central route of elaboration. This type of elaboration requires effortful cognitive processing 
and the resulting attitude of the topic involved relies on the persons own cognitive responses 
as well as message strength and quality. This sort of elaboration is highly dependant on the 
receiver’s involvement, or how much time, effort and energy he or she is willing to vest in 
considering the message. 
When the receiver is neither motivated- nor able to scrutinize the message he or she is likely 
to follow a peripheral route of elaboration. In this, the receiver is expected to rely on less 
thoughtful processes than are exemplified by the central route. These might include simple 
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heuristics or simple cues, such as the length of the message, or source charactristics (Priester 
and Petty, 2003). 
The heuristics systematic model differs from the elaboration likelihood model in that it is 
explicitly a dual process model; that is, it is assumed the two types of message processing are 
qualitatively different although they have reciprocal effects. The elaboration likelihood model 
is a single process model where it is assumed that message elaboration has levels of central or 
peripheral processing. In the heuristic systematic processing model, syst matic processing is 
considered as more effortful and capacity limiting than heuristic processing. For this reason, it 
is assumed that heuristic processing predominates when motivation or capacity for effortful 
processing is low (Chaiken, 1980).  
 
Credibility 
A person’s level of credibility directly implies the extent to which others find it easy or 
difficult to believe that person (Hornby, 1984, p. 200). According to Berlio et al (1978) source 
credibility is something that possesses the quality that “the more of “it” the receiver is 
perceived to have, the more likely the receiver is to accept the transmitted information” (p. 
562). Perceived credibility is considered the most important source characteristic in the Yale 
Model and an almost linear relationship is assumed to be between perceived credibility and 
persuasive power: The more the speaker is perceived to possess credibility, the more 
persuasive his or her message is believed to be (Hovland & Weiss, 1952, quoted in Pratkanis 
et al., 1988). This is also apparent for today’s popular models and the same three factors 
dominate in research on source credibility. These are expertise, or “the extent to which a 
communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions” (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 
1953, p. 21), trustworthiness, or “the degree of confidence in the communicator’s intent to 
communicate the assertions he considers most valid” (ibid) and attractiveness. 
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These three variables, and especially expertise and trustworthiness, have repeat dly been 
used to define source credibility. As for recent examples, Ohanian (1990) identifies source 
credibility as a three dimensional construct composed of expertise, trustworthiness, and 
attractiveness. In this, source credibility implies a “communicator’s positive characteristics 
that affect the receiver’s acceptance of a message” (p. 41). Newell and Goldsmith (1997) give 
expertise and trustworthiness a higher status than Ohanian and Hovland and explicitly define 
source credibility as “the perceived expertise, trustworthiness, and/or attractiveness of the 
information source” (p. 235). 
As is apparent, expertise, trustworthiness, and attractiveness are not only thoughto be 
important factors of credibility; they are often used as the very definition of credibility. 
Placing such a high emphasis of these three factors, though, is a haphazardous endeavour for 
several reasons. Firstly, if it is found that other factors influence credibility as much or more 
than expertise, trustworthiness, and attractiveness, the definition either becomes false or 
incomplete, or these other factors loose their rightful place in being defining for credibility. 
Secondly, it can never be concluded for certain that the effects of these three variabl s re not 
moderated or mediated by still other variables. Finally, Berlo, Lemert and Mertz (1969) 
criticisms of the studies on credibility and persuasion performed by Hovland, Janis, and 
Kelley (1953) still hold and must be addressed. In the Hovland et al studies it was suggested 
that credibility was comprised of two variables; expertise and trustworthiness. These 
variables, Berlo et al. pointed out, were assumed a priori as attributes of credible sources but 
were not derived from scientific observations. Additionally, the variables used in Hovlands’ 
that supposedly increased credibility were exclusively dealt with as attributes of the senders 
themselves, while it should be intuitively more accurate to look at what receivers exp rience 
and perceive of the sender 
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Other factors have been identified as having effect on source credibility, which include 
concepts closely related to social power. However, these are an exception. In an extensiv  
review of by Pornipitakpan (2004) only four studies were identified as naming concepts 
related to power (dynamism, potency, authoritativeness, and power). All were criticized for 
“selecting scales haphazardly, using similar names for factors containing different scales, and 
using certain credibility factor structures as if they were generalizable f r beyond the raters, 
sources, and factoring procedures that generated them”. It was also found that “scales
representing factors of source credibility changed over time and that the number of significant 
factors and their resulting amount of variance also changed over time” (Pornipitakpan, 2004). 
To date, power is not a part of the elaboration likelihood model or the heuristics systematic 
model. 
 
Operational definition of credibility  
What Berlio et. als (1968) criticisms imply is that credibility research should focus on 
finding what factors increase or decrease the likelihood that the receiver accepts the 
persuasive statements of the sender. An accurate estimate of credibility is therefore that which 
increases receivers’ tendency to accept the sources information. Additionally, the component 
which is most important to study for effects on credibility is not the source itself and the 
objective qualities of him or her, but the receiver’s perceptions of the source and message 
situation. In other words, what is important for persuasive purposes is not that the 
communicator possesses qualities that make him or trustworthy, expert, or attractive in itself, 
but how the communicator is perceived and emotionally experienced by the receiver. An 
accurate operational definition of credibility should be the extent to which the communicator 
induces attitude change. If attitude change is not found, the communicator is by definition not 
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credible. In other words, Berlio’s et als. (1969) criticisms imply that there is no need to 
include influential factors such as trustworthiness in the definition of credibility. 
 
Attitudes 
The goal of persuasion is, according to Reardon (1991), “to change someone’s attitudes 
and/or behavior” (p. 5). One of the more widely used definitions of an attitude is that it is  
“mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or 
dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is 
related” (Allport, 1935). According to Eagly and Chaiken (1998), attitudes are lasting, general 
evaluations of people, objects, or issues that operate like schemas to organize information and 
guide behaviour. They define attitudes as “a psychological tendency that is expre sed by 
evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (p. 269)Attitudes are 
closely linked to people’s beliefs; a variable that has been defined as: ”emotional acceptance 
of some proposition, statement or doctrine” (Reber and Reber, 2001), and “the feeling that 
something exists or is true” (Hornby and Ruse, 1988).  
Attitude formation takes place on several levels. According to Wood (2000), when formi g 
an attitude toward an object we need to retrieve relevant information about it from memory 
and at the same time in formation of a standard against which it can be evaluated. The 
relevant information retrieved from memory to formulate an opinion on an object may even 
come from an influence appeal even though the people involved are unaware of this. In such 
an instance the judgment of others is unwittingly adopted as one’s own (Wood, 2000). 
Attitudes are highly context dependent and people can draw on a wide range of information 
and inference rule to arrive at an evaluative judgment and contemporary judgments about an 
object could be constructed on the spot, based on the information and inference rules that are 
most accessible at that point in time. 
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Attitudes are a troublesome variable. According to Norbert Schwarz (2001) they "are a 
hypothetical construct, invented by researchers to account for a body of phenomena. We 
cannot observe attitudes directly but infer them from individuals' self-reports and behavior" 
(p. 438). It is therefore not a straight-forward endeavour to define it, measure it, or to locate 
theoretical underpinnings of this variable. 
 
Emotions 
One method to measure attitudes is based on the conception that attitudes are best explained
as affective responses to stimuli that can manifest in various means, for exampl  by 
behavioural tendencies or cognitive agreement. However, in order for emotions t be a usable 
concept for communication studies, they must be converted to measurable variables. 
One way to make measures possible is to classify automatic emotions and assig  binary 
values to these. When researchers try to distinguish automatic emotions different approaches 
exist. Arnold (1960) and Lazarus (1968), for example, proposed an appraisal theory of 
emotions according to which emotions are elicited and differentiated on the basis of the 
subjective evaluation of an event on a set of standard criteria. According to this paradigm 
appraisal is a “cognitive evaluation process that can produce affect and emotion because the 
evaluation is based on criteria that reflect personal relevance of needs, goals, and values” 
(Scherer, Dan, and Flykt, 2006, p. 109). Appraisal is in this sense intrinsically context a d 
person dependant since individuals differ widely in their assessment of what is pertinent to 
them. 
Another popular model distinguishes between emotions by sets of emotional responses that 
suggest underlying, basic, and automatic emotions. According to these theories emotions have 
evolved by means of their adaptive value for dealing with fundamental life tasks (e.g. Ekman, 
1992; Plutchik, 1980). Humans, according to this view, possess a set of basic values that are 
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recognizable by characteristic facial expressions. Ekman, Friesen and Ellsworth (1972) found 
evidence for this in cross-cultural comparisons of recognition of facial expressions and 
suggested that humans have at least six basic emotions in their repertoire; joy, sadness, fear, 
disgust, anger, and contempt. However, approaches that suggest sets of emotion types have an 
operationalizational problem. According to Grimm, Kroschel and Narayanan (2007), 
measures of important variables are often highly dependent on the researchers’ 
interpretations, and this makes it hard to make quantitative comparisons and measures.  
 
The dimensional approach 
According to another set of theories, emotions have a gradual and continual form that can be 
measured by using polar opposite categories, or dimensions. According to these theories
emotions have evolved from a motivational basis to a simple factorial model. This approach 
differs from those where automatic emotions are distinguished by using sets of emotional 
responses in that expressions of emotions are not considered in binary values; i.e. angry or 
happy, but take any arbitrary value in between dimensions. Emotions are conceived to be 
composed of a different number of attributes that are associated with emotion primitives. 
William Wundt (1896) pioneered this approach when he suggested that emotions could be 
mapped on a three dimensional space. Wundt identified three dimensions of emotions; 
pleasantness vs. unpleasantness, excitement vs. depression and tension vs. relaxation (Wundt, 
1896). Recent repetitions of his approach include Mehrabian and Russell’s (1980) three 
dimensional model of emotions, where the third variable is dominiance-submissiveness, and 
Lang’s, Bradley’s and Cuthbert’s model (2005) where the third dimension is labelled 
dominance (see also Kehrein, 2002, and Grimm, Kroschel, & Narayanan, 2007). Concrete 
operational definitions of emotions and associated variables have made this approach highly 
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applicable in studies ranging from automatic recognitions of emotions in speech (Grimm et al, 
2007) to racism (Henry & Sears, 2002). 
 
Mediational theory of meaning 
According to Burgess and Lund (2000) the mediational theory of meaning, by Osgood, 
Suci, and Tennenbaum (1957), is the most extensive and most used of all dimensional 
theories of meaning and emotions. In to this theory, meaning is assumed to be repres nt d by 
a semantic profile of ratings on a set of adjectives, distinguished by a set of semantic features 
and signified as a vector in an n-dimensional semantic space (Osgood et al., 1957, 1975).2 
Two types of meaning that the cognitive system processes differently are identified. First, 
the denotative meaning of a word can be thought of as its encyclopaedic definition; the 
knowledge based feature of the word. The second type of meaning, affective meaning, are 
sentiments and connotations of the focal object. This affect based meaning mechanism 
supposedly reveals particular dimensions of meaning that people use to qualify their 
experience. The mechanism was thought as more basic and automatic than the denotative 
meaning mechanism and therefore the focus of the mediational theory was to measure this 
type of meaning (Osgood et al., 1975). 
The semantic differential technique was designed to obtain an objective, quantitative 
measure of affective meaning. The technique includes rating scales that differentiate 
attitudinal intensity on the basis of a person’s subjective understanding of the connotative 
meanings of words. With this the researchers wishes to plot a psychological distance between 
                                                
2 Factor analysis was used to extract an n-dimensional solution for what affective meaning people hold towards 
things. In order to achieve this, Osgood and his associates performed numerous experiments where subjects 
made Likert-scale judgements for several adjective scales for concepts. Adjective polar opposites belong t  one 
of these groups and adjective that correlate strongly with each factor were used to measure the score on that 
factor (Osgood, Suci, and Tennenbaum, 1957). 
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words by mapping a subject's connotations of them. Low ratings indicate that the word is 
better characterized by the adjective defining the low end of the scale. High ratings indicate 
that the word is better characterized by the adjective defining the high end of the scale. The 
middle conveys a sense of neutrality. The outcome of a semantic differential is an indicator of 
the affective meaning the subjects hold toward an object and by constructing scales and items 
carefully, it is supposedly possible to identify subtle nuances of such affective meanings 
(Osgood, Suci, & Tennenbaum, 1957, Jowett & O'Donnell, 1999). By using factor analysis on 
a huge data-pool of semantic differential ratings from hundreds of participants on hundreds of 
concepts, three factors were repeatedly found to account for the majority of judgements. 
Extensive cross-cultural studies supported the view that most of the variance in emotional 
assessments was accounted for by these three major dimensions (Osgood et al., 1975). 
Osgood assigned labels to these factors intuitively. The largest factor he called E, or 
evaluation. This factor explains how much the subject likes or has good will towards the 
object; in essence the dimension good – bad. The second factor, P or potency, refers to the 
powerfulness or strength of the object, as exemplified by adjective opposites such as powerful 
– weak and big – small. The third factor, A, or activity, represents the activity, or inactivity, of 
an object, as exemplified in adjective polar opposites such as fast – slow, moving – still etc. 
Osgood suggested an evolutionary explanation for the existence of these three dimensions. By 
deriving a meaning of an object from few easily manageable features that could be processed 
automatically, the organism was better able to make instant in emergency situations (Osgood, 
1967). 
The basic assumptions of the mediational theory of meaning have been supported somewhat 
by modern neurological studies. According to Suzuki et al (2004) different brain modalities 
are modified during judgement of affective meaning related to the three main factors of 
affective meaning; that is, the factors have different information processing bases, especially 
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with respect to their sensory relevance. More specifically, it has been found that the right 
superior temporal gyrus and the right inferior parietal lobule are associated with activity 
ratings, while the brain regions around the central fissure are related to potency rati gs. As to 
sensory relevance, it has been suggested that the scales related to the activiy factors often 
refer to auditory perceptions (adjective opposite such as dynamic-static, excitable- alm, 
noisy-silent) while potency factors often involve adjective scales related to tactile perceptions 
(as evident in adjective opposite such as soft-hard, smooth-rough etc). The Evaluation factor 
is “characterized by scales such as likeable-repugnant, beautiful-ugly and unpleasant-
pleasant” and “associated with subjective emotional concepts that are not dependent upon 
sensory processing or modalities”. It was hypothized that the medial prefrontal c rtex, 
amygdala, the insula, the orbito frontal cortex and the aterior cingulate cortex uld be 
connected to the evaluation factor. 
  
Affect control theory 
The mediational theory of meaning was later adopted in the Affect Control Theory of Heise 
(1979). According to this model, all cognitions evoke affective associations and attitu es can 
be thought of as affective response to the cognition of objects (Heise & Smith-Lovin, 1981).  
In affect control theory, affective meaning refers to subjective evaluation of role 
identities. According to Heise (1979), fundamental sentiments are culturally sh red feelings 
evoked by the mental representation of a concept. These can be social identities, behaviours, 
personality traits etc.  Emotions are described as singular experimental episodes at discreet 
points in time while transient impressions are the emotions evoked in certain situations. 
Deflections are how different they are from the feelings that are expected to b  evoked (for 
example the affect normally experienced with for certain social roles). These deflections and 
the emotions experienced that result from them can be estimated by regression equations. 
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These predict impressions by measuring the amalgamation of affect when two concepts are 
combined (Wiggins, Wiggins & Zanders, 1994). 
 
Authority as a role identity 
In the affect control theory, role-identities are assumed to be connected with emotions and 
proponents of this theory, such as Schneider (2004), argue that social structural properties 
should be reflected in their affective representation. The affective meaning of role identities is 
thus thought to reflect their structural meaning and profiles of affective meaning re used to 
measure sentiments that are attached to specific role identities in particular cultures.  
Authority, like other role identities, is in this sense a social structure embedded in subjective 
representations of culture (Scherer, 2006). In probing what structural pattern legitimate 
authority assumes, Schneider (1999) found a strong tendency for concepts that are associated 
with authoritative role identities (doctor, mother etc.) to share a common pattern, ex mplified 
by high evaluation and dominance, but low arousal ratings. Schneider explains the reliabl
results showing authority figures sharing a profile of affective meaning by referring to Max 
Webers’ rational bureaucratic principle, which involves rules of legitimation that establish the 
authority concept. A rational bureaucratic society is a stratified organization where coercion 
from superiors is legitimized by subordinates when the coercions adhere to internal zed and 
accepted norms. An authority, according to this model, is a social identity that others in the 
society have internalized as being legitimate. Deviations from what is considered legitimate, 
such as using methods that have not been approved or a role identity that has not been 
legitimized as an actor that can use coercion results in non-authority (Schneider, 1999). 
The fundamental paradigm of affect control theory is that people control social inter ctions 
by striving to maintain feelings about the situation they find themselves in (Scholl et al. 
2008). When a person is perceived as being a part of the role identity that Schneider has 
 19 
labelled authority, affect control theory therefore predicts that the recipient will automatically 
strive to control the social interaction by behaving in such a way that maintains the feelings 
about that situation and role identities. When the focal object is an authority the appropriate 
behaviours to that situation are those which maintain the legitimacy of that authority identity. 
If agreement, compliance or conformity are behaviours of low discrepancy in such aituation, 
these behaviours will be expected to prevail. 
 
Recognizing power 
If social power and legitimacy are interpreted by the cognitive system as an uthority role-
identity that triggers low-discrepancy type behaviours that include increased opinion 
agreement, by what mechanism is this recognition brought about? One explanation is that the
cognitive system implicitly interprets perceived dominance of an object as a cue for social 
power. An individual experiences social power by dyadic agonisms or direct contact with 
people who occupy higher strata of a dominance hierarchy and, therefore, possess means by 
which they can apply rewards or punishments for the individual’s behaviour. Repeated pairing 
of a person experiencing perceived dominance of more socially powerful persons makes 
perceived dominance an automatic affective response. 
 
Dominance and hierarchies 
Denotatively, dominance refers to a relationship in which one thing is in a position to 
control over another, and also a tendency to exert control over the behaviour of other 
members of a group of other members of his or her own species (Reber and Reber, 2001, p. 
213). In simpler terms, Hornby (1984) defines the adjective ‘dominant’ as ”having control, 
authority or influence” (p 258). 
 20 
In comparative psychology, dominance hierarchy refers to the ranking of members of a 
group according to relative importance or dominance (Reber & Reber, p 58). In this, people 
assume roles that occupy different and predefined levels, or strata, in an organization. At the 
macro-level, dominance hierarchy refers to an organizational structure which is characterized 
by a system of chain of command. In such a structure, the institutions that govern national 
society have legal rights to take various measures to uphold the structural form (Fritz and 
Cromwell, 2001). 
According to Fritz and Cromwell (2001) dominance hierarchies are the most common 
organizational structures of modern nation-states. Similarly, Coleman (2000) holds that 
societies worldwide organize according to group-based hierarchies, with dominant social 
groups possessing a disproportionate share of positive social value such as wealth, status, 
health and so on. The possession of these resources is an important source for these groups’ 
and individuals’ social power. Those who need these resources but do not possess them must 
rely on these groups’ decisions and are vulnerable to the consequences of the possible 
unwillingness of these to lend access to their properties. 
At the micro-level, the dominance hierarchical structure has different effec s. A person’s 
interactions within the hierarchy are generally, albeit not exclusively, r stricted toward those 
who are situated at the nearest level to that which he or she occupies. A person is generally to 
answer commands given by people that occupy the next level in the hierarchy, but have little 
contact to even superior authorities. The power relationships in a hierarchical stru ture are 
thus simple. The subordinates are to obey orders from superiors, but not vice versa. Society is 
thus organized in a way that authority increases as one travels higher up the hierarchy.  
In interpersonal relation dominance has been defined as the ability to prevail in dy d c
conflict situations (Strayer & Strayer, 1976). The defining aspect of this type of dominance is 
the outcome of interpersonal conflict, or dyadic agonism. This denotative classifi ation of 
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dominance, however, demands actual outcomes of dyadic agonisms to become manifested. 
The question is, how do people recognize the dominance of an object without experiencing 
dyadic agonisms directly? 
 
Socialization and authority 
Human are rarely isolated beings that can be studied in a vacuum. We are a part of 
institutions and a culture of distinct self-perpetuating groups, or societies (Hornby, 1974). 
How these systems are organized shapes our cognitions and in order to explain how common 
life experiences might play a part in shaping how we form attitudes it important to recognize 
the impact of socialization. 
Socialization has been described as “the social processes through which children develop an 
awareness of social norms and values, and achieve a distinct sense of self” (Giddens, 2006, p. 
1036). This is the process were we learn, accept and internalize societies’ norms, belief , 
judgments and values and learn to think of ourselves as parts of different facets of social life 
and through the process achieve a picture of ourselves.  
Schneider (1999, 2004) contends that cultural norms or rules are the source of power in 
contemporary society.3 These refer to “[r]ules of behavior which reflect or embody a culture’s 
values, either prescribing a given type of behavior, or forbidding it” (Giddens, 2006, p. 1027). 
On the opposite, deviance is “non-conformity to a given set of norms that are accepted by a 
significant number of people in a community or society” (ibid, p. 794). Norms can be 
expected to be supported, and deviance is refrained, by social sanctions, or “socially applied 
forces which reward or restrain behaviour” (Giddens, 2006, p. 460). Such sanctions vary, 
from informal disapproval to physical punishment or execution and in modern rich societies it 
is possible to distinguish between two types of social sanctions. The first of these is where a 
                                                
3 To explain this postulate, he sites Max Weber’s burea cratic principle as the accepted source of legitimiz ng 
power in western cultures. 
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group of people who have been designated as having authority to do so actively punish those 
who deviate from rules put forth in institutions of formal governance. These can be actors of 
the modern state, local district authorities etc. In these circumstances, deviance is labelled as 
crime and the rules are laws and regulations. The second type of social sanctions is informal 
sanctions. These are carried out by other members of society, not constituting a formal facet 
of designated authority. These can be peer groups, workmates, family members et cetera. 
Unlike formal sanctions, which are often rigidly filed and classified as law and regulations, 
informal social sanctions are not easily definable and it may take complex research to identify 
them. Peers can use various means to exert sanctions on those who deviate from accepted 
norms. A person might be ridiculed, thereby lowering his or hers regards in the peer group, a 
person making an improper comment on a popular group might be met with criticisms and 
loss of friends and so forth.  
 
Authority: Power and legitimization 
In formal settings, authority refers to institutionalized and legal power as manifested within 
a social system as well as the individuals who wield such power (Reber, and Reber, 2001, p. 
513, Weber, 1978). Kelman and Hamilton (1989) commented that: ”authority involves two 
components: the right to command others and the power to do so” (pp. 53-54). Similarly, 
Hornby (1984) defined authority as “the power or right to give orders and make others obey” 
(p. 52). This implies that authority is composed of two separate variables. The first of these is 
power, or ability to bring about the desired behavioural outcomes that are implied in the 
commands. The second of these; the right to command others, has been labelled legitimization 
(Schneider, 2004). 
According to Tyler (1997) two theories on legitimization of authority are dominant in 
current social psychology. First, resource based theories suggest that instrume tal indices of 
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experience determine the impact of authority and link legitimacy to the favourability of the 
resources that individuals receive from groups and group authorities. According to this model, 
the evaluation of rules and authorities is linked to resources received in the past or expected in 
the future, task competence, people’s judgements about the likely future behaviour of othes, 
outcome fairness, procedural judgements and judgements about investments in group 
membership.  
Another approach to legitimization stems from identity based theories. These suggest that 
relational indices of experience determine the impact of legitimacy and link legitimacy to 
people’s concerns about their social identities from group memberships. How authorities treat 
a person serves as an indicator of his or hers social status, which in turn, influences his or hers 
social identities; feelings of self-worth and so on. According to this model, when people feel 
that they are respected members of groups, they voluntarily follow group authorities’ orders. 
Social identities are understood from their position in their social groups and experiencing 
positive regard from the authority is associated with ease in complying, as forecast by identity 
based theories of legitimisation. When the authority figure appear trustworthy, kind, etc. and 
treat their subjects with respect, their orders are more easily followed. According to this 
approach, when people perceive that these authorities express that they have status, they 
respond with deference (Tyler, 1997).4 
From the standpoint of these theories the factors observed to influence perceptions of 
authority stem from the benefits the people involved felt they received, both in terms of self 
assurance and personal gain, influence how easy they found it to obey authorities. 
                                                
4 Tyler (1997) summarizes the social phenomena of legitimacy of authority as follows: “People within organized 
groups often internalize their feelings of obligation to obey group rules and the decisions of group athorities. 
They believe that group authorities and rules are legitimate and, hence, entitled to be obeyed. Becaus of this 




Legitimization in affect control theory 
In affect control theory, legitimisation is a core aspect of authority and it is not restricted to 
the macro level of institution, but a part of the cognitive structure of the actor (Schneider, 
2004). Schneider explains legitimacy as follows: “[B]eing coerced is an unpleasant 
experience that generally leads to resentment toward the coercer. But if the coercion is 
legitimated, he or she is an authority and may be evaluated positively… legitimation of 
authority means that the authority's power is understood by others, and need not be 
communicated through expressive actions” (p. 9). 
When legitimization is internalized “people often behave in accordance with the rules in 
situations without rewards or the threat of punishments” (Tyler, 1997). When this has 
happened obeying the legitimized authorities’ orders is part of the normal behaviour 
repertoire of the person obeying, and since this should not be an emotional experience, it 
should not be very memorable either.  
 
Utilitarian functions of attitudes 
Instrumental adjustment or utilitarian function of attitudes refers to a functional paradigm of 
attitude formation where the usefulness of holding a certain attitude is held to be crucial to its 
acquisition. In this approach, originally developed by Katz (1960), a key motivational factor
to attitude evaluation is if holding a certain attitude is objectively beneficial or harmful to the 
receiver. 
Several theorists have observed that attitudes, beliefs and other receiver variables have 
utilitarian functions. For example, according to the elaboration likelihood model an important 
feature of attitudes is motivation to hold subjectively “correct” ones. These correct attitudes 
“are helpful because they often allow people to gain rewards and avoid punishments by 
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approaching helpful objects and avoiding dangerous ones. Holding correct attitudes is 
important if people want to act on their attitudes” (Petty, Rucker, Bizer and Cacioppo, 2004, 
p. 68). 
Also, according to Cialdini (1987, 2001) who identified authority as one of six main 
weapons of influence, we are trained to obey authorities from early on; by caregivers, 
religious institutions, schools etc. In such settings it has substantial utilitrian value for a 
person to obey authorities and internalize their values. The child recognizes that caregivers, 
teachers and other authorities have more knowledge and it is a handy heuristics to assume that 
these are usually right. But, even more importantly, these people have the power to cont ol 
reward and punishment for the child’s behaviours. Believing and obeying an authority 
becomes automatic and implicit after this learning takes place. 
Because of the social dominance structure in contemporary industrial societies, b l ving 
socially powerful individuals is more important than believing less powerful individuals. In 
other words, it is of instrumental value for a receiver to agree with a powerful person. 
 
Stimuli materials 
The picture stimuli used in the current study are apprehended from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008)). The IAPS is a collecti n of picture 
stimuli that have been rated in terms of dimensions of affective meaning that is based on, and 
closely resemble these identified by Charles Osgood et. al (1967). The set provides “the 
ratings of affect for a large set of emotionally evocative, internationally-accessible color 
photographs” (ibid, p 2). The IAPS has been developed alongside similar collections for 
words (the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW), Bradley and Lang, 1999), and 
sounds (the International Affective Digitized Sounds (IADS), Bradley and L g, 1999) in 
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order to provide “standardized materials for research on emotion and attention” (Lay, 
Bradley, and Cuthbert, 2002, p. 1).  
The labels used for the three dimensions of affective meaning for the IAPS are ple sure (P), 
arousal (A) and dominance (D). Correlation studies have revealed that these are nearly 
synonymous to Osgoods dimensions, evaluation, activity, and potency. The dimensions were 
assessed for the IAPS by using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM); an affective rating 
system devised by Lang (1980). This is a non-verbal rating instrument for affective meaning 
specially designed for cross cultural researches. It uses a graphic figure depicting values 
alongside each dimension on a continuously varying scale to indicate emotional reactions. 
The stimuli and the ratings of these are therefore not language dependent and cross-cultural 
comparison studies (e.g. Ribeiro, Pompéia, & Bueno, 2005, and Verscuere, Crombez & 
Koster, 2001) have concluded that the stimuli pictures used in the IAPS can be used as an 
affective rating tool across cultures due to a high correlation found across the populations.  
 
Operational definition of dominance 
There are numerous ways to define any term. Here, as is done in affect control theo y where 
a distinction is made between a denotative and affective meaning of objects, a disinction was 
made in this study between the denotative meaning of objects and how they are perceived. 
Specifically, the focus was on the perceived trustworthiness and dominance of the objects 
involved in the study. As Coleman (2000) commented regarding the power variable: “[F]or 
power to be effective, it doesn’t necessarily have to be the result of actual resources wned 
and strategies employed by people but, in some circumstances, by what they are merely 
perceived to have” (p. 125).  
In the current study perceived dominance refers to an affective evaluation of stimuli and is 
defined as the degree to which the focal object, be it human or not, makes the recipient feel 
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submissive (high dominance of focal object), or powerful (low dominance of focal object). 
The definition implies an inherently reciprocal relationship between perceived dominance of 
the focal object and recipients’ her affective responses toward observing it. This operational 
definition is consistent with existent research and is directly derived from how the 
experimental stimuli used in the current study were quantified. This should be seen as positive 
in regards to construct validity. Specifically, the ratings for the dominance variables for the 
pictures in the IAPS had been collected by asking participants to indicate on a nine point scale 
how much the pictures made them feel submissive, dominated, in awe etc. as opposed to 
feeling in power, dominant and related terms (Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert, 2008).5  
 
Perceived authority and trustworthiness 
Interestingly concepts that are commonly used to denote trustworthiness in communication 
studies tend to share the profile of affective meaning that Schneider has labelled uthority. For 
example, concepts that are used to measure trustworthiness in Applbaum and Anatol (1973) 
and ratings for three dimensions of affective meaning generally tend to share Schneider’s 
authority profile when compared with the same concepts that have been rated for dimensions 
of affective meaning (from Bradley and Lang, 1999). Specifically, words such as honesty and 
trust are highly evaluated, highly dominant and have relatively neutral arousal ratings6. 
Concepts used to denote untrustworthy endorsers, on the other hand, tend to be negatively 
evaluated low on dominance scores and highly arousing7. This does not need to be surprising 
considering how the concepts trustworthiness and legitimized authority are defin d. That an 
                                                
5 . It should be noted that high dominance of the speaker is therefore indicated with a low number, while low 
dominance is indicated by a high rating. 
6 e.g. the concept honesty has the values 7.75 (evaluation), 6.75 (dominance), and 6.00 (arousal) and trust has the 
ratings 6.68 (evaluation), 6.61 (dominance), and 5.30 (arousal) on nine point scales where the rating 5.00
signifies a neutral value (Bradley & Lang, 1999). 
7 e.g. the concept sinful has the values 3.00 (evaluation), 4.13 (dominance), and 6.33 (arousal), and the concept 
selfish has the ratings 2.45 (evaluation), 4.64 (dominance), and 5.50 (arousal) on nine point rating scales where 
the rating 5.00 signifies neutrality (Bradley & Lang, 1999). 
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authority is legitimized can be said to be equivalent to saying that an authority is t usted. But, 
however intuitional this comparison may seem, the synonymy of these concepts should not be 
assumed. An empirical examination of a relationship between these concepts should, 
however, estimate these concepts potential similarities.  
 
Trustworthiness revisited 
According to Priester and Petty (2003) a trustworthy endorser "is one whom people rceive 
to be honest and sincere, whereas an untrustworthy endorser is one about whom people feel 
scepticism and suspicion" (p. 408). Typically, trustworthiness was operationally defined as 
“the listener’s degree of confidence in, and level of acceptance of, the speaker and the 
message” in Ohanian (1990, p.41).  
This does not mean that trustworthiness has a straight-forward definition. In studies 
performed by McGinnies and Ward (1980), trustworthiness was manipulated by describing 
the highly trustworthy source “as being viewed by his contemporaries as honest, si cere, and 
trustworthy” and “having developed an interest in Gambia’s maritime concerns duri g a 
vacation there at his own expense” (pp. 468 – 469). A non-trustworthy endorser was 
described as being sympathetic to a Nazi party and having a reputation for being devious, 
calculating, and inclined to personal gain above public welfare (p. 469). Pre-tests, where 
participants are asked to rate the level of expertise or trustworthiness they perc ive the source 
to possess, are often used to assess the level of these variables and these are usd for further 
measurements of effects of these variables. As pointed out by Berlo et al. (1968), with the 
information given in such studies it is hard to assess what exact underlying factors constitute 
source trustworthiness or if the effects apprehended are mediated by some variabl s that are 
not identified explicitly. Additionally, the operational definitions of trustworthiness are 
apprehended by direct questions on the variables themselves. The meaning of these variables
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are strongly dependent on the researchers own interpretations and assumptions on what 
constitutes as trustworthiness.  
An alternative explanation as to why perceived trustworthiness increases credibility is that 
the receiver of the source message implicitly recognizes the speaker’s high ocial power and 
evaluates him or her positively. High social power is translated into a classific tion of the 
object person as belonging to a profile of legitimized authority which is characterized of 
having high evaluation-, high dominance-, and neutral arousal dimensional ratings of affective 
meaning. 
If the object is positively evaluated in addition to being perceived as dominant, it will 
automatically be understood on an affective level as a legitimate authority. In other words, 
dominance and positive evaluation translate to a legitimized authority role identity. 
Experiencing this role identity triggers a learned set of responses that result in increased 
opinion agreement, and thus increased credibility. But why does the authority profile include 
a neutral or low value for arousal, and how could this relate to the trustworthiness concept?  
 
Counterfactuals 
   A possible explanation for the apparent importance of low or neutral arousal, or activity
ratings of concepts which belong in the authority profile of Schneider (1999) stems from 
counterfactuals. Counterfactuals are "mental representations of alternativ s to the past" 
(Roese, 1997). This type of thinking often occurs after the experience of unpleasat vents; 
but in effect they happen after events that are deemed important for the person that 
experiences it.  
There are two forms of counterfactual thinking. The first involves a comparison of an event 
that actually took place, and an event that one believes that had been a better option, but did 
not actually take place. This is called "upward comparison", and can be described as “upw rd-
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directed, self-focused counterfactual thoughts” that occur after the occurren e of important 
events (Morris and Moore, 2000). These “posit alternative circumstances that are evaluatively 
better than actuality” (Roese, 1997). The second form of counterfactual thinking is downward 
comparison, or downward counterfactuals. These “posit alternative circumstances that are 
evaluatively worse than actuality” (Roese, 1997). Here, an even worse scenario, that never 
happened, is imagined, the actual event is compared with this worse scenario. This thougt 
should be met with a positive emotion; relief. 
According to Morris and Moore (2000) both upward and downward counterfactuals have 
adaptive functions and beneficial learning effects. They are activated by strong, usually 
negative emotional reaction to an event, and according to Roese (1997) their functional 
implications involve learning. Upward counterfactuals for example, elicit negativ  effect that 
“serve as signals to the organism that all is not well and that corrective thinking and action is 
required to fix this problem” (Roese, 1997). Downward counterfactuals, on the other hand 
“may energize or motivate future striving” (p. 138). In effect, the positive feelings of relief 
experienced after downward counterfactuals thoughts serve as rewards for a job well done, 
while upward comparisons serve as punishments and defer the organism from repeating th  
malignant behaviour. 
The effectiveness of this learning process is enhanced by various factors tha  are measured 
in different ways. The most important factor is self-efficacy. A measure of s lf-efficacy is the 
perceived behavioural control (PBC), a concept coined by Ajzben (1988). It is defined as the 
subject’s perception of how easy or difficult it would be to perform the focal action. The 
general assumption is that an individual is more likely to decide to perform an actio if that 
action seems possible than if circumstances or personal abilities are likely to make 
performance of the action problematic. It has been suggested that when the variabl  PBC is 
high, it is not major predictor of behavior. It does become important in actions where PBC is 
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low (Madden, Ellen, and Ajzen, 1992). Having high belief that one can behave differently the 
next time a similar situation occurs, aids in improving behavior (Roese 1997).  
   Here we may speculate what emotions might be brought about from encountering legitimat  
authority. Specifically, if the speaker is believed to have the power to bring negative results to 
the listener but does not use his or her power, the receiver should experience relief, and the 
positive feelings generated could project over to the speaker; hence making him more likable. 
In conjunction with being considered powerful and not expressive, the speaker assumes or 
affirms the role authority. A more positive evaluation of a powerful, but inactive, source is 
thus affected by downward counterfactuals. 
 
Operational definition of trustworthiness 
The operational definition of trustworthiness used in the current study was derived from 
scales that were used both in Pornpitakpan (1997) and Ohanian (1990). In these studies, 
trustworthiness was composed of four variables: predictability, dependability, faith, and 
sincerity. An extensive review by Pornpitakpan (2006) of the literature of source credibility 
research revealed that these scales are typical among those used to measure th  
trustworthiness construct. The current study focused on the relationship between percived 
dominance and these variables. It was suggested that source trustworthiness, or level of trust, 
is related to the role identity labelled authority. Because this role identity is hought to 
strengthen when perceived dominance increases, increasing dominance should therefore 
simultaneously increase trustworthiness. 
 
How is the current study unique when compared to previous studies 
The present research promises improvements into the studies of persuasion by offering a 
concrete operationalization for a variable that has been described as one of the social scien es 
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most important concepts. The operational definition of perceived dominance makes 
quantifiable measurements on refutable hypotheses possible. If it is found that dominance has 
mediating or moderating effects on trustworthiness this could be seen as an improve ent 
from traditional studies where basic variables, such as expertise and trustworthiness, lack 
theoretical underpinnings that could minimize their dependability on each researcher’s 
interpretations. 
 
The connection between previous research and the present work 
The present work aims to test hypotheses which are derived from affect control theory and 
theories on counterfactuals on persuasion variables. Previously, studies on persuasion have 
not focused on the possible implications of these theories on the variables tested. 
Additionally, the study aims to offer an explanation for why and how certain role identities 
are formed and what effects they have on the attitudes of others. 
 
Why was the study performed 
The purpose of this research was to investigate how perceived dominance influences 
opinion agreement, message evaluation, and perceived credibility. It was suggested that a 
general schema, of something that is better to believe or obey than not to, is created by 
experience and evoked when confronted with appropriate stimuli. 
Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1: Communicators of higher levels of perceived dominance will induce more 
opinion agreement than communicators of lower levels of perceived dominance. 
It is suggested that perceived dominance of message sources results in an increased 
state of submissiveness for receivers. This state is interpreted by the receive s’ cognitive 
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system as a cue for high social power of message sources. The immediate effects of these 
implicit interpretations are manifested as an increased tendency to agree with opinions put 
forth. Therefore, it is predicted that agreement to persuasive messages will be higher if 
dominance is high rather than low.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Communicators of higher levels of perceived dominance will be perceived as 
more trustworthy than communicators of lower levels of perceived dominance 
To test for the effects of dominance on trustworthiness, a second hypothesis state that 
communicators of higher levels of dominance will be perceived as more sincere (ærlig), 
dependable (pålitelig), worthy of ones faith (troverdig), and reliable (tillitsvekkende), than 
communicators of low levels of dominance. 
Rationale for the study 
The current study serves three purposes: First, to investigate how perceived dominance 
influences persuasion, and secondly, to identify dominance as an underlying construct of 
source credibility. Secondly, the study aims to examine if, and how, affect control theory and 
research tools that have been developed from it, can explain fundamental variables in 
communication research. The study may be seen as an attempt to offer a quantifiable measure 
of the potentially important variable, dominance. The expected findings would press for 
revaluation of some important variable since source dominance could be a moderating, or 
even mediating, factor for these. It is hoped that the study helps to improve communication 
research models by offering alternative explanations for earlier findings a d perhaps replace 
these with simpler, quantifiable variables. At the very least the expected findings should offer 





The study involved 48 participants, aged 19 to 67 (Mean = 28,5, SD = 10,3) of roughly 
equal gender distribution (23 male, 25 female). These were recruited by three means. First, 
thirteen guests at a local café in Tromsø participated in the study in exchange for discounts on 
foods and beverages. Second, 20 students in introductory methodology for psychology studies 
participated in the study in exchange for partial course credits. The final 15 participants were 
guests of a library in the University of Tromsø. These received a lottery ticket for their 
participation. It was explained to all participants that participation was voluntary and that no 
personal information would be asked for or kept. 
Design 
A 2 (source dominance: high or low) X 2 (human or nonhuman (garden) pictures) factorial 
between-subjects design was employed. As an additional within-subjects factor, the study 
used a persuasive message that featured opposing arguments from two communicators 
(source: “the community” versus “the opposition leader”). In order to evaluate the possible 
effects of dominance on source and message factors in persuasion, a comparison was made  
between ratings from recipients who received identical questionnaires save for  stimulus 
picture embedded within the text. Recipients were randomly selected to receive on  of four 
versions of a document which was designed to look like an official poll created by local 
authorities in Reykjavik, Iceland.  
Independent variables 
Isolating the dominance variable: In the first of two pictorial conditions, the picture of each 
version were of a musician. The ratings of these were virtually identical for two of the three 
core variables of affective meaning, pleasure (P) and arousal (A), but differed in the variable 
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of interest, dominance (D). With this, the variable dominance was isolated as the only variable 
that differs between the two conditions. 
However, finding a difference in participants’ ratings by these manipulations is i ufficient 
to prove that these are caused by different levels of dominance since there are various 
alternative explanations should any differences be found. The three dimensions of affective 
meaning may not control for variables such as attractiveness, age, and clothing that may offer 
alternative explanations that undermine the notion that it is the difference in dominance th t is 
the primary cause of effects. 
In order to exclude such alternative explanations, a second condition was introduced to the 
study design. In these, the picture stimuli manipulation factor was repeated. Pictures 
embedded within the text in these conditions also had virtually identical ratings for the 
evaluation and arousal dimensions, but differed in the dominance dimension. However, these 
pictures contained no human models, but only gardens. A difference in participants’ ratigs
for these conditions, in addition to difference between the person pictures, effectiv ly exclude 
any alternative explanations for differences in credibility ratings linked to already established 
effects linked to person variables. If the difference in agreement and credibility ratings is 
repeated in the garden condition, this should offer strong evidence for the studies’ propo al 
that increasing the perceived dominance of the source simultaneously increases a sense of 
being dominated in the recipients; a sense which translates to legitimate authority role identity 
of all communicators. 
 
Stimulus pictures: In the person-picture condition, the high dominance picture was of a 
musician that had the values 5,66 (SD = 1,44) for P, 3,80 (SD = 1,93) for A, and 5,67 (SD = 
1,78) for D, respectively. The low dominance condition made use of a picture stimulus, also 
of a musician, that had the values 5,69 (SD= 1,36; difference from strong condition 0,03 
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datapoints) for P, 3,74 ( SD = 1,93) for A (difference of -0,06 from the picture in the strong 
condition), and 6,12 (SD = 1,66; difference 0,45 from the picture in the strong condition) for 
D.8 For the second pair of pictures, the high dominance condition was of a garden that had the 
values 7,01 (SD = 1,50)  for P, 3,91 (SD = 2,27) for A, and 5,53 (SD = 2,01) for D. The low 
dominance condition was a picture rated as having the values 7,06 (SD = 1,71; difference 0,05 
from the strong condition) for P, 3,83 (SD = 2,49; difference of -0,08 from the picture in the 
strong condition) for A, and 6,73 SD = 2,04; difference 1,2 from the strong condition) for D.  
An unpaired t-test, conducted by the current experimenter from data available in Lay et. al 
(2008), for difference of means for the high- and low differences of D values for the person 
condition yielded t(198) = 1.85, p = .033, one-tailed. A test for difference of means for the 
high- and low differences of D values for the garden condition yielded t(198) = 4.19, p < 
.0001, one-tailed. No significant differences of P or A values were present. 
Control procedures 
Initial attitude toward topic: The questionnaire was purposively designed in such a way that 
participants would be not be likely to have extremely positive or negative views on the
messages of either source and also that the issue would not be of high involvement for the 
participants. This was done to minimize effects of discrepancy on evaluations of the 
messages. Discrepancy in persuasion is the difference between the initial attitude of the 
audience and the content of the persuasive message. Too much discrepancy has been found to 
impair persuasion. The audience will, generally, reject messages that are too far from their 
initial attitudes. But if there is no discrepancy, no attitude change can take place (Aronson, 
Turner, & Carlsmith, 1963). A moderate discrepancy is therefore thought to be optimal for 
persuasive attempts.  
                                                
8 As explained earlier in this paper, higher values of the dominance variable indicate a lower perceived 
dominance of the focal object in Lang et al. (2008) 
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Additionally the questionnaire was designed in such a way that effects of description that 
might be linked to variables such as expertise and trustworthiness of the source wld be 
minimized. For this reason, the two sources were not described thoroughly, but only as “the 
leader of the opposition” and “the commune,” respectively.  
Responses to the questionnaire as well as comments made during the debriefing wer used 
as indicators that a subject knew the purpose of the research. No participants describe  that 
they suspected the true purposes of the questionnaire. 
 
Source specificity: Another question that might be raised is which of the two sources included 
in the questionnaire does this effect influence? At first sight one might expect that these 
effects should only apply to the opposition source since this is the person who is identified in 
the person condition. However, the submissive state of the recipients should not be limited to 
one source. Rather, this state should translate across sources. This should be especially 
obvious in the garden-picture conditions where neither message source are identifi d, but only 
the garden which is the matter of debate. What are causing the differences in agreement 
ratings are not personal variables, but a state of submissiveness that increases recipient’s 
tendency to agree with any statements. This state of submissiveness is the implicit heuristics 
cue that the speaker is of higher than lower legitimate authority and should therefore b  
believed. Therefore, the effects of dominance should be non-source specific.  
 
Importance of topic: In designing the magazine article for the questionnaire care was taken to 
choose a topic that would not be likely to be of high importance for the Norwegian subjects. 
Earlier studies have indicated that when task importance is low, heuristic processing, or 
peripheral elaboration, of the credibility cue exerts more influence on participan s’ judgments 
of the message then systematic processing, or high elaboration of the quality of the message 
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(Chaiken and Maheswaran, 1994). Effects of source variables are therefore expect d to be 
more important for topics of low important and since the message itself was identical for all 
experimental conditions, systematic processing alone might not yield to any significant 
difference in outcome between conditions. To this means, the topic was made to take place in 
a different country than Norway (namely Iceland). With this it was assumed that participants 
would not consider the topic as equally relevant as if it had taken place in more proximate 
settings. Additionally, it was assumed that participants would not have sufficient knowledge 
of the topic and the settings to have the capacity to use systematic processing. Both relevance 
of the topic and capacity to elaborate the message are important conditions for high 
elaboration processing according to the heuristic systematic- and the elaboration likelihood 
models of persuasive communication (e.g. Priester and Petty, 2003).
 
Ambiguity of topic: Similarly, care was taken to choose a message that was fairly ambiguous. 
Therefore, two sources were presented that offered opposing viewpoints on the topic. The 
reason for choosing an ambiguous message is that under such conditions heuristic processing 
has been found to bias systematic processing, even under high elaboration (Chaiken and 
Maheswaran, 1994). For this reason, the ambiguity of the message presented is consi ered to 
result in a distributed effect of the study variable across identified sources. By this it is meant 
that increasing dominance of the source influences judgments on the messages from both 
sources identified in the text. The expected finding is that more dominant pictures lead to
more agreement to the messages in general, regardless of who is identified as th  source of 
these. 
Procedure 
The message: Each participant randomly received one of four versions of the mock-up poll. 
On the first page of this was the one-page text explaining the topic and context tha  
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participants were asked to indicate their opinions of. In the poll, opposing viewpoints on 
planned changes of a public garden were listed. Embedded within the text was the study 
variable, one of four stimuli pictures that differed in dominance ratings. This was followed by 
3 pages of rating scales.  
In the introductory text two opposing viewpoints regarding future planning of a public 
garden in Reykjavik, Iceland, were introduced. The two opposing viewpoints, each offering 
numerous arguments (5 pro, 6 con), were explained as coming from two sources. The first 
was the communal authorities, which were in favour of the changes, and the second was a 
person labelled as the spokesman for an organization that was opposed to the communal 
plans. Two message sources were identified in the text; the communal authorities who gave 5 
reasons for changing how a local park would be run, and an opponent of such plans who gave 
6 reasons for opposing the plans. Participants were informed that since the issue was thought 
to be legally relevant to all Nordic countries it was important to get a picture of th  general 
attitudes towards the matter presented (see appendix 1 for further detail). 
Dependent variables 
Opinion agreement: After reading a persuasive message, participants rated the extent to which 
they agreed or disagreed with opinions The rating scales for this section of the questionnaire 
consisted of 11 statements (questions 1.a to 1.k, see appendix) made in the article that the 
participants could rate on 9-point semantic differential scales to indicate their level of 
agreement-disagreement.  
 
Agreement to source 1; the opposition: Reliability measures, using Cronbach’s Alpha 
Reliability Coefficients, revealed that the coefficient for the rating across all six answers to 
the opposition's viewpoints was .74. Item-total statistics indicated that the data would not 
improve much by leaving any item out; therefore a summary score was computed by 
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averaging across all six answers. The summary score had a theoretical range from 1 
(“completely disagree”) to 9 (“completely agree”).  
 
Agreement to source 2; the commune: Cronbach's Alpha across all five answers to the 
commune's viewpoints was .74. Leaving out question 10 (commune question 1.j, see appendix 
1) improves Cronbach's Alpha to .80. Therefore, a summary score was computed by 
averaging across only four items (1.g, 1.h, 1.i, and 1.k). It had a theoretical range from 1 
(“completely disagree”) to 9 (“completely agree”). 
 
Opinion evaluation: A measure of evaluation of messages from each source was apprehended 
with eight bi-polar rating scales. The rating scales for each viewpoint were identical. In the 
first scale participants rated the extent to which they felt that the overall message of the 
appropriate source was good or bad (bra versus dårlig, question 2.1 and 3.1), sympathetic or 
unsympathetic (sympatisk versus usympatisk, questions 2.2 and 3.2), exciting or boring 
(spennende versus kjedelig, questions 2.3 and 3.3), and irritating or not irritating (irriterende 
versus ikke irreterende, question 2.4 and 3.4). First of these were four 9 point scales where the 
participants were asked to indicate their overall attitudes toward the opposition leaders’ 
viewpoint (questions 2.1 to 2.4) and these were followed by identical questions regarding the 
commune’s viewpoints (questions 3.1 to 3.4).  
Where necessary, participants’ responses on the eight variables were revers -coded such 
that greater scores indicated more positive evaluation. Reliability measures, using Cronbach’s 
Alpha, revealed that the average coefficient for all four ratings for the opposition’s viewpoints 
was .811. Item-total statistics indicated that the data would not improve very much by leaving 
any item out. Therefore a summary score was computed by averaging across all four answers. 
The summary score had a theoretical range from 1 (negative evaluation) to 9 (positive 
evaluation). Similarly, Cronbach’s Alpha for all four ratings for the commune’s vi wpoints 
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was .816. Item-total statistics indicated that the data would only be impaired by laving any 
item out. A summary score was therefore computed that had the same theoretical range s the 
summary score for the opposition’s viewpoints. 
 
Perceived trustworthiness: A test for hypothesis 2, that higher dominance leads to higher 
ratings of perceived trustworthiness, was apprehended by means of on four bi-polar scales. 
Only the source mentioned as the opposition was included in the test.9 P rceived source 
credibility was operationalized as the extent to which recipients rated the source on four 
scales. The scales consisted of the adjective opposites uærlig versus ærlig for questi n 4.1 
(roughly insincere versus sincere); pålitelig versus upålitelig for question 4.2 (roughly 
translatable into dependable versus unreliable), tillitsvekkende versus ikke tillitsvekkende for 
question 4.3 (roughly translatable to dependable versus undependable) and ikke troverdig 
versus troverdig for question 4.4 (roughly translatable to the extent to which one is worthy of 
faith, nearly synonymous to credibility).10 Where necessary, the variables were reverse-coded 
such that greater values indicated greater trustworthiness. Cronbach's Alpha reliability test for 
all four items was .88. Item-total statistics indicated that the data would not improve much by 
leaving any item out; therefore an aggregated score, labelled source trustworthiness, was 
composed out of these four variables. The aggregated score had the theoretical rating range of 
1 (“completely non-trustworthy”) to 9 (“completely trustworthy”). 
 
Measures of source specificity:  The next part of the questionnaire consisted of three scales on 
which the participants were to rate the extent to which they thought the plans of the commune 
were good or bad for question 5.1 (bra versus dårlig), intelligent or unintelligent for question 
                                                
9 The rationale for this is that only the opposition s identified as a person that can possess personal credibility 
characteristics. The source identified as “the commune” is not a person, and can therefore not be evaluated as 
such.  
10 These scales were derived from Pornitikpans (1997) definition of trustworthiness. 
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5.2 (tåpelig versus smart), and useful or useless for question 5.3 (nyttig versus ikke nytt g). 
This variable could serve as a secondary measure of persuasion, after the more important 
agreement-with-statement ratings. Where necessary, variables wer rev se-coded such that 
greater scores indicated more positive evaluation. Cronbach’s Alpha across all three answers 
was .80. An aggregated score was composed out of the three variables which had the 
theoretical range 1 (positive evaluation) to 9 (negative evaluation). The three items were 
averaged into a summary score with a theoretical range from 1 to 9, where greater values 
indicate more positive attitudes towards the community’s plans. 
Importance: The reader was next asked to rate how important he or she felt that the topic 
matter was (question 6). The variable had a theoretical range of 1 (“not important at all”) to 9 
(“very important”). This variable was included to enable a check for randomisation problems 
due to possible interactions of importance on the effects of dominance. 
Suspicion of intent: In order to evaluate if participants believed in the authenticity of the cover 
story an open ended question (question 7, see appendix) probed for their comments on the 
matter. The actual, but unstated rationale for this item was to allow participnts to articulate 
their eventual suspicions on the authenticity of the article.  
 
Thoroughness: Next, an item that probed participants for how thoroughly they read the text 
(question 8, see appendix) followed. The variable had a theoretical range of 1 (“not 
thoroughly at all”) to 9 (“very thoroughly”). This variable was included to enable a chck for 
randomisation problems due to possible interactions of how thoroughly the participants read 
the document on the effects of dominance on the dependent variables. 
 
Sex and age: The questionnaire ended with two questions where participants were asked to 
indicate their sex (question 9.1, see appendix) and age (question 9.2, see appendix). These 
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measures were included in order to be able to describe the demographical characteristics of 
the study sample as well as to test for randomization problems that could be linked to th se 
variables. 
 
After the participants had finished the questionnaire and returned it to the experiment r the 
participants were debriefed and the true purpose of the questionnaire was revealed. It was 
explained to participants that no data regarding the identities of the respondents would be 
published and that they had the right to withhold the questionnaire if they chose to. No 
participants chose to do so. The debriefing section was also used to identify if any participants 
suspected the true purpose of the study. No participant gave hints to that they did so. 
 
Results 
Tests of randomization problems 
Importance: An analysis of variance, using dominance and picture versions as factors, but 
importance ratings as the dependent variable was conducted. Tests of between-subjcts effects 
yielded no significant difference between conditions with respect to how important 
participants found the issue, although importance ratings were a bit higher in t person-
picture condition (M = 6.70, SD = 1.33) than in the garden-picture condition (M = 5.88, SD = 
2.31). These differences were far from significant, F (1, 43) = 2.14, p > .15.  
 
Thoroughness: Similar tests probed for a difference in the effects of dominance on message 
agreement as a function of how thoroughly participants read the text. Any such finding ha  
suggested a randomisation problem in the data that would have weakened the hypothetical 
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results. Neither main effects nor an interaction of image version and dominance were 
observed, with all three F < 1, and ns.  
 
Sex, and age: Tests of between-subjects effects revealed no interaction from either sex, or age 
on the effects of dominance on the three main dependent variables were found, with all F < 1, 
and ns.  
 
Summary of randomisation effects. There is no evidence for differences between the 
experimental conditions in terms of how important the participants found the issue, what the 
participants age or sex, or how thoroughly they read the article. Since such effects were not 
found, any effects of the experimental factors found can not be due to a randomisation 
problem in the experiment. 
 
Main findings  
 
Effects of dominance on opinion agreement:  
 
Agreement with statements made by the source “opposition”:  The summary scores of 
agreement with statements made by the opposition leader were submitted to an analysis of 
variance with the between-subjects factors dominance (low vs. high) and image content
(person vs. garden). Although agreement with opposition statements was somewhat grater 
when dominance was high (Mean = 7.49, SD = 0.94) rather than low (Mean = 7.19, SD = 
1.20), analysis of variance yielded neither significant main effects nor a significant 
interaction, with F (1, 45) = 0.85, p = .362 for the effects of dominance on tendency to agree. 
This finding does not lend support to Hypothesis 1. However, measures of skewness revealed 
large negative skew for question 1.a (skewness = -2.93, SE = .343), question 1.b (skewness = -
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2.1, SE = .343), and question 1.c (skewness = -1.54, SE = .343) which indicates considerable 
ceiling effects. 
 
Agreement with statements made by the source “the commune”: Th  analysis was then 
repeated, this time using the summary scores of agreement with statements by the community 
as the dependent variable. Analysis of variance revealed that agreement was significantly 
higher in high dominance conditions (Mean = 5.15, SD = 1.52) than in low dominance 
conditions (Mean = 4.22, SD = 1.57), F (1,44) = 4.14, p < .05. These results support 
Hypothesis 1. The absence of an "image" main effect (F < 1, ns) shows that agreement does 
not differ between person- and garden-picture conditions. Most importantly, the absence of an 
interaction between "level of dominance" and "type of image" (F < 1, ns) shows that the 
dominance main effect does not differ between the image conditions. This suggests that the
dominance effect is present in both conditions. 
 
Repeated-measures analysis of agreement with statements: N xt, a repeated-measures 
analysis of variance was conducted. As before, dominance (low vs. high) and image version
(person vs. garden) were used as the between-subjects factors. Both summary scores 
(agreement with the opposition, and agreement with the commune) were entered 
simultaneously as dependent variables. This yielded an additional factor (a within-subjects 
factor); a bipolar variable where one of two types of agreement ratings; agreement with the 
opposition and agreement with the commune, result from ratings from each participant. The 
analysis revealed the main effect that agreement was much higher with oppositi n statements 
(Mean = 7.36, SD = 1.08) that with the commune statements (Mean = 4.68, SD = 1.60). This 
difference is highly significant, F (1, 44) = 61,65, p < .001, Although this finding is in itself of 
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no interest for the present study's hypotheses, it highlights the suspicion that agreement 
ratings with opposition statements (questions 1.a to 1.f) suffered from ceiling effects. 
The analysis further yielded a significant source dominance effect, F (1, 44) = 10.34, p = 
.002 as predicted by Hypothesis 1. No significant interactions of agreement ratings were 
found; all F < 1, ns. 
The two previous analyses had not revealed significant differences between dominance 
conditions in the agreement with the opposition, but only for agreement to the commune, 
suggesting that dominance effects on the participants’ level of agreement with s atements 
differed as a function of who had made these statements – which would be counter to 
Hypothesis 1. In contrast, because of the absence of significant interaction effects, the present 
analysis did not suggest the same. 
 
Follow-up analyses: Simple effects within image conditions: To follow up on the previous 
result, separate repeated-measures analyses of variance were then conducted within each 
image condition. The means and standard deviations are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Agreement with statements 
Image Dominance Mean Std. Deviation 
low 7.18 1.33 Opposition 
statements high 7.43 1.06 
low 4.17 1.83 
Person 
Commune 
statements high 5.15 1.67 
low 7.19 1.13 Opposition 
statements high 7.63 .85 
low 4.27 1.34 
Garden 
Commune 
statements high 5.15 1.43 
Note. The table shows ratings of agreement with statements from the opposition, and from the 
commune. Higher scores indicate greater agreement. For each cell, n = 12. 
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These analyses confirmed that people agree more with opposition statements than with 
community statements. This effect exists in each of the two image conditions, person image: 
F (1, 22) = 23.96, garden image: F (1, 22) = 42,52; for both Fs, p < .001. These main effects 
are not important for the test of hypotheses. But, importantly, the interaction of the repeated-
measures factor “agreement” with the experimental factor “dominance” was not significant in 
either image condition (both Fs < 1, ns). The absence of that interaction confirms that all 
effects of dominance in the data affect agreement with both kinds of statements to abou  the 
same degree. Previous analysis which used the whole sample that yielded these result  is 
therefore confirmed, even within each of the image-condition subsamples separately. 
Most importantly, however, tests of between-subjects effects for the repeated-measures 
factor “agreement” with the experimental factor “dominance” confirmed the hypothesis of the 
study. Within each of the image conditions, “dominance” has a significant main effect in the 
predicted direction – both when the image showed a person, F (1, 22) = 4.51, p < .05, and 
when the image showed a garden, F (1, 22) = 5.94, p < .03. Together with the absence of 
interactions (as described a few lines above), the results of this analysis lend strong support to 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
Effects of dominance on perceived source trustworthiness: An analysis of variance with the 
trustworthiness summary scores as the dependent variable, and dominance (low versus high) 
and image (person versus garden) as the between-subjects factors was conducted i order to 
assess Hypothesis 2; which predicted a positive relationship between dominance and 
perceived trustworthiness. Although the pattern of means was in the expected direction, no 
significant effects were found, all F < 1.8, all p > .19. This result does not confirm Hypothesis 
2. 
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As a next step, the analysis was repeated separately for each of the four variables that made 
up the trustworthiness summary score. These analyses showed no significant effects for the 
“uærlig-ærlig” and “pålitelig-upålitelig” ratings, but showed significant dominance main 
effects for the “tillitsvekkende-ikke tillitsvekkende” and “troverdig-ikke troverdig” ratings. 
Therefore, a new summary index was computed from the latter two ratings alo e. 
 The analysis was then repeated with this new index. The means and standard 
deviations are shown in Table 2. 
 
  Table 2. Trustworthiness ratings 
Image Dominance Mean Std. Deviation 
low 6.50 1.53 Person 
high 6.91 1.45 
low 5.58 1.78 Garden 
high 7.13 1.63 
Note. The table shows trustworthiness ratings (new index). Higher scores indicate gre r 
perceived trustworthiness. For each cell, n = 10 to 12. 
 
Dominance was found to be positively related with trustworthiness: The source in high 
dominance conditions was rated as more trustworthy (Mean = 7.02, SD = 1.51) than the 
source in the low dominance conditions (Mean = 6.00, SD = 1.70), F (1, 41) = 4.12, p = 
.045. The image condition (person versus garden) did not have a main effect, F < 1, ns. 
Importantly, the dominance effect that was described before did not differ between image 
conditions, F < 1.4, p > .245 for the interaction effect. In sum, after removing variables that 
increased the statistical noise, the results for the new trustworthiness index le  significant 





Summary of findings 
It was hypothesized in the present study that 1) higher dominance conditions would produce 
more opinion agreement than low dominance conditions, and 2) the more dominant source 
would be perceived as more trustworthy than the low dominant source. 
Both hypotheses were generally supported in the study. A relationship was found between 
perceived dominance and increased opinion. Message evaluation was more positive in the 
high dominance conditions than the low dominance conditions. Finally, perceived 
trustworthiness was found to increase as a function of increased dominance of the picture 
manipulation. 
The effects observed were not mediated by the type of picture that was used (pictures of a 
person, or pictures of a garden) which lends strong support for the theoretical assumptions, 
because this finding excludes alternative explanations around message source chara teristics 
such as attractiveness, age, clothing etc. Additionally, the effects were not media ed by age, 
elaboration or sex and the effects were nearly identical for both sources introduced in the text; 




Hypothesis 1, that communicators of higher levels of perceived dominance induce more 
opinion agreement than communicators of lower levels of perceived dominance was generally 
supported by the study, although non significance was found in one condition. Participants 
who read poll messages in the high dominance conditions agreed more strongly with the 
statements made in the text than recipients who read questionnaire messages in the low 
dominance conditions. These effects were not moderated by picture model (human or garden), 
which undermines alternative explanation for the results that are based on source 
characteristics such as age, sex, and attractiveness. Main effects of dominance on statement 
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agreements were observed. Hypothesis 2, that communicators of higher levels of perceived 
dominance will be perceived as more credible than communicators of lower levels of 
perceived dominance, was supported by the study. Significant differences were found for 
ratings on believability and credibility between low dominance and high dominance condition 
participants.  
 
Implications of the results 
The primary goal of this study was to determine if perceived dominance increases opinion 
agreement and perceived trustworthiness of communicators. As predicted, data analysis 
revealed a significant linear effect for dominance of picture stimuli embedded within a text. A 
positive relationship between dominance and opinion agreement was found and direct 
measures indicated that high dominant sources were perceived as more trustworthy. The 
absence of  effects of identification of source (human versus garden) support the no ion that it 
is dominance, not confounding variables such as attractiveness, that is the cause of the 
difference in agreement tendencies between conditions. 
It was suggested that a sense of credibility or authority can be explained in terms of 
conditioning theory, as well as from counterfactuals. Life-long conditioning in varous social 
institutions, where obedience in certain situations is rewarded, learned and generaliz d result 
in a high-order group of generalized authority. In order for a group or group authority o 
become legitimized and internalized it must fit this category of generalizd authority, the 
perception of which would put recipients into a submissive state and evoke patterns of 
behaviour from a repertoire of, what might be called, ‘obedience behaviour’. This translates to 
an increased tendency to accept persuasive messages from dominant, or powerful, sources. 
The study supports the idea that affective meaning of authority is linked to a cognitive state of 
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submissiveness and that there is a reciprocal influence of positive evaluation and perceived 
dominance of a message source. 
Theoretical consequences 
The results that were apprehended from the study can have substantial implications for both 
affect control theory and persuasion models such as the elaboration likelihood model and the 
heuristics-systematic model. For affect control theory it offers an explanation on how the role 
identity profile labelled as “authority” by Schneider (1999) receives its meaning and what 
effects this profile of affective meaning has on the attitudes of others. The results supported 
the explanation that instrumental utility of attitudes, learned through socialization and 
experience with dominant role identities, creates the affective profile of legitimised authority 
that is instrumentally better to agree with than not to agree with. For persuasion studies, such 
as the elaboration likelihood model, the results suggest that important source credibility 
variables be tested for possible moderating, or even mediating, effects of perceived 
dominance. 
 
Trustworthiness: Some studies have identified trustworthiness as the single most important 
variable of the source credibility construct (e.g. McGinnies & Ward, 1980). Several models of 
communication and persuasion define source credibility, the variable Hovland (1953) 
considered as the most important variable in communiaction research, in terms of 
trustworthiness, expertise and attractiveness (e.g. Goldsmith, 1997; Ohanian, 1990). However, 
the operational definitions of trustworthiness have been somewhat fuzzy. 
The study reported in this paper suggests that trustworthiness depends not only on perceived 
good-will of the endorser, but is intrinsically related to his or her perceived dominance. Two 
reasons are given for this relationship. First, it is contended that people implicitly interpret a 
positively evaluated, powerful speaker as a legitimate authority and that this role model 
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translates to a sense of credibility. This mental heuristics is learned through experience with 
societies’ dominance hierarchies. It is a conditioned set of responses that has significant 
instrumental value for the person since it simplifies decision making in message ev luation to 
that which has the highest probability to lead to positive responses. Not obeying this heuristics 
leads more often to negative results in the hierarchically organized structure that dominates 
the commonalities of societies such as the Norwegian. It is assumed that legitimacy and 
dominance are intrinsically connected and that perceived legitimacy itself re ts on perceived 
dominance. 
A question left out in Schneiders’ (1999, 2004) studies is, why do role identities that are 
identified as authorities high in evaluation and potency, but low in activity? As to the reason 
why activity is low, Schneider has suggested that the act of using ones power effectively 
undermines the focal persons legitimized authority. But in addition to Schneiders 
explanations, it has been suggested in the current study that there exists a reciprocal 
relationship between evaluation and dominance. According to theories on counterfactuals 
(e.g. Morris, 2000, Roese, 1997), if the speaker is considered powerful; or is believed to have 
the power to bring negative results to the listener, the person that experiences unrealized 
power might experience relief and the positive feelings generated could project over to the 
speaker and the messages he or she puts forth; hence making both more likable. In 
conjunction with being considered powerful and not expressive, the speaker assumes the rol 
identity labelled authority by Schneider (1999). Therefore, the proposal made in this paper 
was that a person who is thought of as a possible threat but does not use his or her power is 
not only experienced as more of an authority but in general evaluated more positively than a 
person who is not thought of as a possible threat and that this results in increased perceived 
trustworthiness of the communicator. 
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The sleeper effect: In addition to affecting the theoretical construct trustworthiness itself, h  
current study may offer alternative explanations to some well established phenomena. For 
example, studies on source credibility have yielded a phenomenon called the sleeper eff ct. 
This effect is thought to be occurring when recipients’ acceptance of a persuasive argument 
from a low-credibility source increases over time while acceptance of a persuasive argument 
from a high-credibility source decreases. But if dominance plays a large role in the construct 
source credibility, the sleeper effect could also be explained differently. The alternative 
explanation is simply that initially the recipients were put in a mildly submissive state, leading 
to an increased tendency to agree with speaker. As this state wanes and is forgotten, so is the 
effect of source credibility. The findings of the current study therefore call for examination 
into the effect of source dominance on the sleeper effect. 
 
Mood: Several studies have concluded that when people are in a positive or cheerful mood, 
they are generally more compliant then when they are in a bad mood (e.g. Krugman, 1983, 
Milberg, & Clark, 1988). These effects have been found to be different for low- and high 
elaboration recipients, with a more direct effect on compliance for low elaboration ecipients 
(Petty, Gleicher, & Baker, 1991). An effect of positive mood on compliance for high- 
elaboration condition has been interpreted as such that it biases retrieval of relevant 
supporting information, or that positive mood has an informative function that is relevant to 
the recipients’ possible reactions (Petty, Cacioppo, Sedikides, & Strathman, 1988). Using 
affect control theory, these results could be interpreted differently. The dimension of affective 
meaning that has been labelled as valence (Lang, et al. 2005) was operationally defined as the 
extent to which participants feel “happy, pleased, satisfied, contentful, hopeful” (p. 5). This 
signifies positive affect of the recipient. That higher valence increases legitimized authority 
has been predicted by Schneiders (1999, 2004) studies. Isolating this variable in a similar 
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fashion as has been done with dominance in the current study could confirm that valence is 
also correlated with increased opinion agreement. This, in addition to the results repor ed in 
this paper, leads to the question, to what extent could the authority profile of Schneider (1999) 
explain current variables in persuasion studies? Even though we are far from establishing that 
source credibility is synonymous to Schneiders authority profile, it cannot yet be excluded. 
 
Limitations and future research 
If future research should bring more evidence that perceived dominance increases message 
acceptance, it becomes important to establish why this is so. Here, it has been suggested that 
individual learning of appropriate behaviour in societal situations results in a heuristics that 
brings about these results. With socialization the individual adapts the strategy that dominance 
is a cue for social power and that it is beneficiary to increase agreement with such role 
identities. But alternative explanations, or mediating variables, could account for this effect 
and should be tested. From an evolutionary or biological perspective, it could be postulated 
that such effects are the result of innate pecking-order responses. We might thus be 
predisposed to follow a hierarchical structure and obey apparently dominant persons becau e 
the have evolutionary adaptive values. One way to test if societal variables do or do not play a 
role is to compare groups that have been pre-tested as to have experienced different lev ls of 
societal indoctrination. For example, we might compare these effects with people who have 
received few versus many years of formal schooling; years of working in a hierarchical 
workplace; being raised in a city or farm and so on. From the hypotheses made in the current 
study, one would expect that a person who has spent less time in formal public schooling, is 
used to working independently and is brought up in an environment where fewer authority 
figures must be obeyed than more would be less susceptible to dominance effects than one 
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who has more years in schooling, more experience in a hierarchical workplace, and is raised 
in a highly hierarchical society etc. 
 
Neurological underpinnings: Neurological studies have revealed that pictures that have been 
rated as emotionally arousing on the three dimensions of affective meaning produce late, slow 
positive voltage change in scalp-recorded event-related potentials. This effect is not found 
when participants view emotionally neutral pictures and it is believed that this indicates a 
selective processing of emotional stimuli, reflecting the activation of motivational systems in 
the brain (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000). In order to assess the 
neurological effects of perceived dominance, this variable should be isolated with similar
intent.  
In order to evaluate what sort of brain activity is likely to be linked to the effects r ported in 
the current study we can assume that during judgement of affective meanings related to 
concepts that belong to the super-class “authority”, the brain modules associated with fear or 
related emotional responses, such as the amygdale and the orbitofrontal cortex, should show 
heightened activation during such judgement. Such a finding would support the 
argumentation offered in the current study. 
Positive versus negative initial disposition: Subjects with a positive disposition toward the 
communication issue have been found to be more persuaded by moderately credible sources 
than by high credibility sources (Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt, 1978). Highly credible 
sources have been found to be more persuasive than moderately credible sources if the 
message recipients are negatively predisposed to the message. These effects only occur when 
the communicator is identified prior to the message (ibid). The reason why highly credible 
sources are found to be more persuasive when recipients have a negative disposition toward 
the message is presumed to be that a highly credible source serves to inhibit counter-
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argumentation, whereas a moderately credible source facilitates it. However, moderately 
credible sources have been found to be more persuasive when the recipients are favourably 
predisposed to the communication issue. The reason for this is presumed to be because 
message recipients feel a need to bolster support for a position they favour when the 
communicator is of questionable credibility and that they therefore elaborate the arguments, 
but feel less inclined to engage in this cognitive work when a highly credible source is 
presenting the favoured position. 
However, as explained earlier, for a source to become a legitimate authority, e or she must 
be positively evaluated but moderately active in addition to be high on dominance. If the 
source is perceived as either negatively evaluated or highly active, it has been uggested that 
he or she will lose their legitimacy and be classified into a different category that has different 
results for credibility. Therefore, studies should be made that isolate these variables, 
evaluation and arousal. Finding that these influence these effects would undermine the above 
mentioned predictions on initial disposition since they indicate that other variables, not taken 
into consideration, moderate the effects observed. 
Conclusions 
The main conclusion of the present study is that perceived dominance influences 
persuasion. The mechanism by which the cognitive system recognizes that a person possesses 
social power, it is contested, is perceived dominance of the object person. This perception of 
dominance serves as a cue for power and this cue is translated into a classification of the 
object person as a legitimate authority. This triggers a set of learned cognitive responses that 
result in an increased tendency to agree with persuasive messages, thus increasing th  
credibility of the apparently powerful person. 
Final summary statements 
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As to why perceived dominance increases opinion agreement and perceived trustworthiness 
of an endorser, this paper suggests that dominance serves as an implicit mental cue for social 
power. Because of the social dominance structure in modern western societie , this cue is of 
instrumental value for the individual. Believing socially powerful individuals is more 
important than believing less powerful individuals. This cue is recognized by an automatic 
affective response to being exposed to a stimulus that is perceived as highly dominant. 
 
Importance and relevance 
 
The manipulation procedure of the main independent variable used in the current study has 
the advantage that it offers a quantifiable measurement, has a clear definition, and is refutable. 
These advantages are missing for some key variables used in the elaboration likelih od model 
and the heuristics systematic model, such as expertise and trustworthiness, as already 
mentioned. The current study gives perceived dominance a possible place as a basic 
underlying variable in persuasion. Finding such variables has been described as the mo t 
important work of theorists in persuasion. This was the view of Carl Hovland (1953) who 
proposed that a primary goal of communication research is to isolate factors that account for 
the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of persuasive communication (cited in Patzer, 1983, pp. 
130-1). Taking this into consideration, the results reported in this study should overall 
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Starfshópur um framtíð Hljómskálagarðsins           
    
Spørreskjema 
Bruk og styring av sentrale folkeparker 
 
Friluftsområdet Hljómskálagarðurinn er en av Reykjaviks eldste og best bevarte parker. 
Parken ligger ved det berømte tjernet som deler Reykjavik i øst og vest, og har navnet sitt 
etter en paviljong som ligger i den ene enden av parken. I Hljómskálagarðurinn er det blant 
annet muligheter for å grille og lekeapparater for barn, samt turstier langs tjernet. Gjennom 
tidene har det vært mulig å bruke deler av parken til kunstutstillinger, demonstrasjoner, 
konserter o.s.v. Likevel synes mange at parken brukes for lite. Mens andre deler av 
Reykjaviks sentrum er livlige er parken ofte stille. 
 Nå diskuteres det i kommunen å legge parken om for å få økt aktivitet i den. Prosjektet 
har spesielt fokus på skolene, fra barnehager og oppover til universitetet og kunstskolee og 
planen er at aktiviteten i parken skal bli organisert av et utvalg fra kommunen i samarbeid 
med representanter fra skolene. Meningen er å legge til rette for økt bruk av ute-områder blant 
byens studenter og barn og å gi en ny arena for kunst og kulturuttrykk. Det vil bli mulig for 
skoler og grupper å leie hele parken i minst et døgn av gangen og parken vil bli stengt for det 
allmenne publikum under avvikling av arrangement. Kommunen håper på denne måten at blir 
aktiviteten i parken øker og at flere mennesker får bruke den. 
Magnus Sigurðsson, musiker og talsmann for en nyopprettet 
arbeidsgruppe mot kommunens planer, er ikke overbevist 
om at dette er en god idé. “Hljómskálagarðurinn er en av 
Reykjaviks eldste folkeparker og har i seg selv kulturell 
verdi.” Magnus synes ikke at det er problematisk at parken 
brukes ikke i full kapasitet. “I dag kan alle gå gjennom 
parken uten å måtte betale eller søke om tillatelse. Parkens 
stillhet er et viktig tilbud i byens ellers bråkete miljø”. 
Magnus ser ikke ulemper med å ha liten styring på parken. 
”Det er mer positivt å ha et åpent område i byens sentrum 
som er enkelt og gratis å bruke for enkelt anledninger en å 
fastbooke det, selv om bookingen er for en god sak. Med å 
stenga av området taper alle i Reykjavik frihet til å nyte parken og bruke den når den er 
booket. Kommunens plan er et tegn på kommunens over-styring av byens kunstliv. Dette blir 
ikke å føre til økt kreativitet eller ny kunst, tvert imot. Mangel på styring er ikk  en ulempe, 
men selve grunnen til at parken er bra. Fokus på eget initiativ og frihet, som er grunnen til at 
vi bruker parken vanligvis, er nettopp det som gjør kunstlivet i Reykjavik så bra. Midlene som 
går med til dette prosjektet burde heller bli brukt i informasjonskampanjer for å få flere til å 
nyte parken og til å støtte skolene og barnehagene i å lage sine egne prosjekter hvor som helst 
i byen, uten styring fra kommunen” sier Magnus.  
 Det er fortsett delte meninger om kommunens planer og helt uklart hva resultatet blir, 
men både de som er med og i mot har erklært vilje til å følge demokratiet. Kommunen har 
stiftet en arbeidsgruppe for å finne ut hva om hva besøkende, spesielt fra kulturelt like 
samfunn som Norge og Danmark, og beboere i Reykjavik egentlig synes om saken, siden den 












Magnus Sigurðsson (på bildet) 
er ikke enig med kommunens 
planer. 
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Følgende er spørsmål om saken. Husk at det ikke er noen rette eller feile svar på p-
ørsmålene, og vi foreslår at du bruker magefølelsen når du svarer. 
 
1. Vis på skalaene nedenfor i hvilken grad du er enig eller uenig i følgende utsagn: 
 
a. Det er positivt å ha et åpent uteområde i byens sentrum som er enkelt og billig å bruke. 
 
Svært enig   □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Svært uenig 
 
b. Det er mer positivt å ha åpent område i byens sentrum en å fastboke det, selv om bokingen 
er for en god sak. 
 
Svært enig   □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Svært uenig 
 
 
c. Et åpent, fritt område er viktig for byens samfunn, selv om det er ikke mye brukt. 
 
Svært enig   □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Svært uenig 
 
 
d. Med å organisere området taper alle i Reykjavik frihet, selv om ikke mange brukerdet i 
praksis. 
 
Svært enig   □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Svært uenig 
 
 
e. Parkens stillhet er i seg selv viktig for besøkende og byen generelt. 
 
Svært enig   □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Svært uenig 
 
 
f. Pengene som blir brukt til å bygge opp den nye parken, bl.a. til å betale for vakthold og 
andre ansatte, skulle heller bli midlet direkte til skolene. 
 
Svært enig   □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Svært uenig 
 
 
g. Det er viktig å ha mye aktivitet i en park som står i byens sentrum 
 
Svært enig   □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Svært uenig 
 
h. Grundig organisering av parken fører til økt kunstnerisk kreativitet i byen 
 




i. Med å organisere parken grundig økes friluftsaktivitet hos barn og studenter. 
 
Svært enig   □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Svært uenig 
 
 
j. Det er viktig for samfunnet at barn og studenter blir aktivt opprettet til å delta i 
kunstutvikling og friluftsaktivitet 
 
Svært enig   □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Svært uenig 
 
 
k. Med å organisere parken grundig får flere nyte den 
 




2. Hva synes du om opposisjonens talsmann sin budskap?  
 
God           □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Dårlig 
Sympatisk       □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Usymptatisk 
Spennende    □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Kjedelig 
Irriterende      □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Ikke irriterende 
 
 
3. Hva synes du om kommunens budskap?  
 
God           □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Dårlig 
Sympatisk       □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Usymptatisk 
Spennende    □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Kjedelig 
Irriterende      □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Ikke irriterende 
 
 
4. Vis på skalaene nedenfor hvordan du oppfatter kilden Magnus Jónsson, som er 
intervjuet i artikkelen: 
 
Uærlig            □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □     Ærlig 
Troverdig      □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □     Ikke troverdig 
Til å stole på    □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  Ikke til å stole på 




5. Hvor viktig synes du at saken er? 
 
 




6. I det neste minuttet, vennligst skriv ned alle tankene du har om saken. Etter at 
minuttet har gått, eller hvis du blir ferdig før minuttet er over, vennligst svar på 













7. Vis på skalaen nedenfor hvor nøyaktig du leste teksten: 
 
Ikke nøyaktig            □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □    veldig 
nøyaktig 
 
8. Jeg er en 
 
□  Mann       □  Kvinne 
 
Takk for at du svarte på spørreundersøkelsen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
